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Abstract We analyse the steady-state equilibrium dynamics of the conventional overlapping 
generations economy à la Diamond (1965) with pay-as-you-go public pensions and second period 
of life divided between working and retirement time in a proportion dependent on the individual 
health status (a rather realistic assumption especially in the current world with high longevity). In 
contrast to an economy without public health spending – which is always stable with monotonic 
trajectories –, an economy with tax-financed health care services (which in turn affect the individual 
health status and hence the length of the retirement time) may experience complex equilibrium 
dynamics with deterministic chaotic business cycles and, in particular, complicated dynamical 
phenomena, such as multiple “bubblings” may occur when crucial economic parameters change. 
Interestingly, it is shown that increasing the size of PAYG pensions, although initially may trigger 
chaotic cycles, eventually works for stability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The problems concerning the public provision of health care services and pension benefits for 
retired mature workers are currently high on the political agendas in several industrialised countries. 
As is known, health status may affect the individual economic behaviours through multiple 
channels. One of them is surely represented by the effects that health may exert on both the ability 
to work and the productivity of work.1 The link between health status and labour productivity has 
been early recognised by the pioneering Grossman (1972). Moreover, several studies have 
empirically found that health status has a significant effect on labour force of older people (e.g. 
Chirikos, 1993; Currie and Madrian, 1999; Campolieti, 2002; Cai and Kalb, 2006; Disney et al., 
2006). However, the role played by both public health spending and retirement age on the 
equilibrium dynamics of a neoclassical growth model has not so far been deeply investigated. In 
this paper we aim to fill this gap in the framework of the famous Diamond’s (1965) model extended 
with the following three simple realistic assumptions: (i) old people may supply labour for a 
fraction of their time endowment when old depending on their health status, (ii) the individual 
health status, in turn, depends in non linear form by the size of the public health spending, and (iii) 
public PAYG pensions exist to support the old-aged unable to work and thus retired. 
    In order to concentrate on the effects of health spending and pension benefits on the length of the 
age of retirement we abstract from considering adult mortality and the utility effect of health per se, 
and moreover we also neglect the role of leisure. 
    In particular, we assume that the length of the retirement period (conversely, the working period), 
which is of course a fraction of the second period of life span of people, only depends on the 
individual health status when old. This means that the date of retirement is chosen neither 
                                               
1
 The other main channel through which health may affect economic growth and that has been more largely investigated 
is that between health and longevity rates (e.g. Chakraborty, 2004; de la Croix and Ponthiere, 2010; Leung and Wang, 
2010). 
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voluntarily by mature workers nor in a mandatory way by governments, while being “objectively” 
determined by the health status of mature individuals: if health is low, then mature workers are 
“authorised” to retire and thus they are “entitled” to a pension benefit (alternatively, it may be 
assumed that for the period of sickness, in which old individuals cannot work, they receive a pay-
as-you-go health insurance bonus). 
    The main finding of the present paper is the following: when the conventional Diamond’s model 
is extended with the three assumptions above mentioned, the equilibrium dynamics may be 
oscillatory. Moreover, both regular and chaotic business cycles seem to be the rule rather than the 
exception for this economy. In particular, it is worth noting that deterministic chaotic motions 
emerge in a simple one-dimensional model with Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, 
which a rather rare occurrence in the OLG context with production. In fact, so far the literature has 
shown that complex outcomes typically occur either in higher dimension models for low values of 
the elasticity of substitution in production, in particular for values well below unity (i.e., in the case 
of the Leontief technology),2 or abandoning the rational expectation paradigm and then assuming 
myopic expectations, where deterministic chaos can emerge at high values of the inter-temporal 
elasticity of substitution (e.g., Michel and de la Croix, 2000; de la Croix and Michel, 2002; Chen et 
al. 2008). 
    Moreover, it is noteworthy that the equilibrium dynamics of the present model shows a rather 
high complexity – i.e., multiplicity of “bubbling” phenomena. The bubbling phenomenon shows 
that the regular bifurcation pattern reverses itself, undergoes period halving via flip bifurcations, 
and eventually returns to a unique steady state for larger parameter values.3 
                                               
2
 For instance, Reichlin (1986) discusses the Leontief case, and in Farmer’s (1986) example for the CES technology, 
endogenous cycles occur only when the production function exhibit lower factor substitutability than the Cobb-Douglas 
function. 
3
 Pioneering discussions about this dynamical feature are Bier and Bountis (1984) and Stone (1993). 
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    In addition to the feature of multiplicity of bubblings, for which a continuum of regularities and 
irregularities in the economic behaviour appear for the most part of the feasible policy changes (we 
used the contribution rate to the pension system as the bifurcation parameter), it is interesting to 
note that relatively high values of the contribution rate eventually tend to smooth economic 
fluctuations, thus properly working for the global “stability” of the economic system. This twofold 
role of such a policy parameter is remarkable from an economic point of view: on the one hand, it 
may concur to explain the observed irregular business fluctuations – showing that an endogenous 
deterministic origin of economic cycles may be complementary to the stochastic origin which is at 
the core of the real business cycle theory – but, on the other hand, and maybe more important, the 
policy variable may even be used to control and potentially to suppress undesirable business 
fluctuations. Thus, we may conclude that the equilibrium dynamics of this simple economy may 
embody two undisputable stylised facts: the existence of both irregular business cycles and the self-
evident persistence of the economic system. 
    The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3 the dynamics of the 
economy is analysed and discussed. In Section 4 the complexity of the dynamic behaviour of the 
economy is shown. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes. 
 
2. The economy 
 
2.1. Individuals 
 
Consider a general equilibrium overlapping generations (OLG) closed economy populated by a 
continuum of identical individuals of measure one. Life is divided into youth (first period) and old-
age (second period). In each period, individuals are endowed with one unit of time. 
    When young, agents of generations t  work and inelastically offer their whole time endowment 
on the labour market, while receiving wage income at the competitive rate tw . This income is used 
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to consume ( tc ,1 ) and to save ( ts ). Moreover, the government levies wage income taxes on the 
young’s labour income, at the constant rates 10 << τ  and 10 << θ , to separately finances at a 
balanced budget health care services and public PAYG pensions, respectively. Therefore, the 
budget constraint of a young agent born at t  reads as 
 ( )θτ −−=+ 1
,1 ttt wsc . (1.1) 
    The unitary time endowment of the old-aged is divided between working time ( 1+td ) and 
retirement time ( 11 +− td ). For the fraction of time supplied on the labour market, they receive 
earnings equal to 11 ++ t
e
t wd , where 1+t
ew  is the wage individuals expect to earn at time 1+t , while as 
regards the retirement time, they expect to be entitled to an amount of public pensions ( ) 111 ++− tet pd  
(see, amongst others, Hu, 1979; Momota, 2003). The budget constraint at 1+t  of an old person 
born at t , therefore, is 
 ( ) ( ) 111111,2 11 ++++++ −+++= tettetttet pdwdsrc , (1.2) 
that is, consumption when old 1,2 +tc  is supported by savings plus expected interests from t  to 1+t , 
accrued at the rate 1+ter , the expected wage income for the working time when old, d , and the 
expected pension benefit for the retirement time, d−1 . 
    In this paper we assume the coefficient 1+td  is endogenous and determined by the individual 
health status when old, which, in turn, is assumed to positively depend on the public health 
spending the government provides at t , th , i.e. the healthier an old individual, the larger the 
fraction of time devoted to supply labour. The relationship between the working time in the old-age 
period (i.e. the old-age labour supply) and health expenditure is assumed to be captured by the 
generic non-decreasing-bounded function:4 
                                               
4
 Alternatively, this amounts to assuming that the health technology is a non-decreasing bounded function of health 
expenditure and the working fraction of the second period of life is proportional to the individual health status with a 
proportionality coefficient equal to one. 
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 ( )tt hdd =+1 , (2) 
where ( ) 00 0 ≥= dd , ( ) 1lim dhdh =∞→  and 10 10 <<≤ dd . 
    Preferences of individuals of generation t  over young-aged consumption and old-aged 
consumption are described by the following lifetime logarithmic utility function: 
 ( ) ( )1,2,1 lnln ++= ttt ccU β , (3) 
where 10 << β  is the degree of individual (im)patience to consume over the life cycle. 
    The representative individual wishes to choose how much to save out of her disposable income in 
order to maximise the lifetime utility index Eq. (3) subject to Eqs. (1), where actual and expected 
factor prices, the coefficient 1+td  and the expected pension benefit 1+t
ep  are taken as given. 
Therefore, the saving rate is: 
 
( )
( )( ) ( )[ ]11111 111
1
1
1
++++
+
−+
++
−
+
−−
= t
e
tt
e
t
t
e
t
t pdwd
r
w
s ββ
θτβ
. (4) 
 
2.2. Firms 
 
At time t  firms produce a homogeneous good, tY , by combining capital and labour, tK  and tL , 
respectively, through the constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology αα −= 1ttt LAKY , where 
0>A  is a scale parameter and 10 << α  the output elasticity of capital. Labour supply is 
( )tt dLL += 1 , where L  is the constant number of workers in each cohort (young and old); then, we 
set 1=L  without loss of generality. Therefore, output per efficient worker ( ty ) as a function of 
capital per efficient worker ( tk ) is 
 
α
tt Aky = , (5) 
where ttt LYy /:=  and ttt LKk /:= . 
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    Firms maximise profits5  and perfect competition guarantees that factor inputs are paid their 
marginal products, that is 
 11 −= −αα tt Akr , (6.1) 
 ( ) αα tt Akw −= 1 . (6.2) 
 
2.3. Government 
 
The government separately finances with labour income taxes both health care services (e.g., 
vaccines, hospitals, scientific research and so on) to ameliorate the individual health status, and 
unfunded PAYG pensions to transfer resources from the young to the old, at a balanced budget. 
    As regards health care expenditure at t , it is constrained by the following per capita government 
budget: 
 tt wh τ= , (7.1) 
the left-hand side being the health expenditure and the right-hand side the tax receipt (see 
Chakraborty, 2004). 
    The per capita pension accounting rule followed at t , instead, reads as: 
 ( ) ( )tttt dwpd +=− 11 θ , (7.2) 
the left-hand side being the pension expenditure and the right-hand side the tax receipts. 
 
2.4. General equilibrium 
 
Exploiting the one-period forward pension accounting rule Eq. (7.2) to substitute out for the pension 
expenditure into Eq. (4) and using Eqs. (2), the saving rate can be rearranged as 
                                               
5
 Without loss of generality, we assume the price of final output is normalised to unity and capital totally depreciates at 
the end of each period. 
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( ) ( )
( )( )
( )[ ]
( )( )1
1
1
1
11
1
111
1
+
+
+
+
++
+
−
++
−
+
−−
=
t
e
tt
e
t
e
t
e
tt
t
r
hdw
r
whdw
s β
θ
ββ
θτβ
. (8) 
Given the government budgets Eqs. (7), market-clearing in goods and capital markets is determined 
as the equality between investments and savings tt SK =+1 , that can also be expressed as: 
 ( )[ ] ttt shdk =++ 11 . (9) 
    Now, combining Eqs. (8) and (9), assuming individuals are perfect foresighted (i.e. the future 
values of both the wage and interest rate is expected to depend on the future value of the capital 
stock), and using Eqs. (6.2) and (7.1) to obtain a relationship between the fraction of working time 
when old and capital per efficient worker, i.e. ( )tkd , the dynamic evolution of capital is simply 
described by the following first order non-linear difference equation with constant coefficients: 
 
( )
( )t
t
t kMdL
kyIk
+
=+1 , (10) 
where ( )( )θταβα −−−= 11:I , ( ) ( )αθβα −++= 11:L  and ( )αθαβ −++= 11:M  are positive 
constants and ( ) αtt Akky = from Eq. (5). 
 
3. Dynamics 
 
Analysis of the phase map Eq. (10) gives the following propositions as regards the existence and 
uniqueness of the steady state, monotonic and oscillatory dynamics and the possibility of 
endogenous fluctuations depending on the length of the retirement time. 
 
Proposition 1. (Existence and uniqueness of the steady state). A unique non-trivial steady state 
0* >k  of the dynamic system described by Eq. (10) exists. 
 
 8 
Proof. Define the right-hand side of Eq. (10) as ( )kJ . Since ( ) 00 0 ≥= dd , then it is straightforward 
to verify that ( ) 00 =J . Now, fixed points of Eq. (10) are determined as interior solutions to 
( )kJk = , that can also be rearranged as ( ) ( )kZkZ 21 = , where ( ) α−= 11 : kkZ  and ( ) ( )kMdL
IAkZ
+
=:2 . 
Therefore, since ( )kZ1  and ( )kZ2  are continuous functions and: 
 
(i) ( ) 001 =Z , ( ) ( ) 01,1 >−=′ −αα kkZ k  for any 0>k  and ( ) +∞=+∞→ kZk 1lim , and 
 
(ii) ( ) ( ) 0002 >=+= G
IA
MdL
IAZ , where 0: 0 >+= MdLG , ( ) ( )( )[ ] 02,2 <+
′
−
=′
kMdL
kdMIAkZ kk  for 
any 0>k  since ( ) 0>′ kdk  and ( ) ( ) 0lim 2 >=∞+=+∞→ E
IA
MdL
IAkZk , where 0: 1 >+= MdLE , 
G
IA
E
IA
< , since GE >  because 10 10 <<≤ dd . 
 
Then for any 0>k  we get ( ) ( )kZkZ 21 =  only once at *k . Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 2. (Non-monotonic behaviour). If 
 yd εε > , (11) 
and  
 ( ) ( ) Qkdkd
yd
y
⋅
−
=>
εε
ε
:ˆ ** , (12) 
then the law of motion in Eq. (10) is non-monotonic, where 
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( ) ( )*
*
*:
kd
kkdkd ′=ε  and ( ) ( )*
*
*:
ky
kkyky ′=ε  are, respectively, the elasticity of the supply labour when 
old and the elasticity of GDP per efficient worker with respect to the stock of capital per efficient 
worker evaluated at *k , and 1: <=
M
LQ . 
 
Proof. Differentiating ( )kJ  with respect to k  gives and evaluating it at *k  gives: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( )[ ]2*1*
*
*
kMdLk
kdMLIA
kJ ydyk
+
−−
=′
−α
εεε
. (13) 
Since ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }** sgnsgn kdMLkJ ydyk εεε −−=′ , then yd εε >  is necessary and ( ) ( )** ˆ kdkd >  
sufficient to have ( ) 0* <′ kJk . If yd εε <  then ( ) 0* >′ kJk  always holds. Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 3. (Endogenous fluctuations). If (11) and (12) hold and 
(1) if ( ) ( ) ( )***ˆ kdkdkd << , then the law of motion in Eq. (10) is non-monotonic and convergent to 
*k ; 
(2) if ( ) ( )** kdkd = , then a flip bifurcation may generically occur;6 
(3) if ( ) ( ) ( )*** kdkdkd << , then the law of motion in Eq. (10) is non-monotonic and divergent from 
*k ; 
(4) if ( ) ( )** kdkd =  a reverse flip bifurcation may generically occur; 
(5) if ( ) ( ) 1** << kdkd , then the law of motion in Eq. (10) is non-monotonic and convergent to *k , 
where 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) α
α
εε
−
−
−−+−
= 1*
*1*
*
2
2
:
kM
kPIAkL
kd yd , (14) 
                                               
6
 In the numerical example in the next section we show that the flip bifurcation is super-critical and, hence, attractive 
(i.e., the bifurcation points are symmetrical and stable). 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) α
α
εε
−
−
+−+−
= 1*
*1*
*
2
2
:
kM
kPIAkL
kd yd , (15) 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) αεεε −−−= 1*22* 4: kIALIAkP dyd . 
 
Proof. From Eq. (13) we find that ( ) 1* −≤′ kJk  if and only if 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 02 1**1*2*1*2 ≤++−−+ −−− yyd IAkLLkdIAkLMkdkM εεε ααα . (16) 
If ( ) ( ) 02 1* >−−− ydIAkL εεα , then (16) can never be verified and the steady state is stationary 
through oscillations. If ( ) ( ) 02 1* <−−− ydIAkL εεα , then when ( ) 0* >kP  two positive real solutions 
exist of (16), as given by Eqs. (14) and (15) where ( ) ( ) 0** >> kdkd , such that ( ) 01 * <′<− kJ k  if 
( ) ( ) ( )***ˆ kdkdkd << , ( ) 1* −=′ kJk  if ( ) ( )** kdkd = , ( ) 1* −<′ kJk  if ( ) ( ) ( )*** kdkdkd << , ( ) 1* −=′ kJk  
if ( ) ( )** kdkd =  and ( ) 01 * <′<− kJ k  if ( ) ( ) 1** << kdkd . Q.E.D. 
 
In order to elucidate how the main steady-state macroeconomic variables react to a change in the 
size of the pension system, θ , as well as to grasp the economic intuition behind the results, we now 
perform a sensitivity analysis by modelling the relationship between the working fraction of the old-
age period and health expenditure with the following rather general function, following for instance 
Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Blackburn and Issa (2002),and de la Croix and Ponthiere (2010):7 
 ( ) δ
δ
t
t
tt h
hddhdd
∆+
∆+
==+ 1
10
1 , (17) 
                                               
7
 Although in the analyses by Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Blackburn and Issa (2002), Chakraborty (2004), de la 
Croix and Ponthiere (2010) and Leung and Wang (2010) the dependent variable is the longevity rate rather than the 
fraction of working (retirement) period in the old-age, the line of reasoning to justify this formulation may be the same. 
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where 0, >∆δ , 10 0 <≤ d , 001 >> dd , ( ) 00 0 ≥= dd , ( ) ( )( ) 01 2 01
1
>
∆+
−∆
=′
−
δ
δδ
h
ddhhdh , 
( ) 1lim 1 ≤=∞→ dhdh , ( ) 0<′′ hdhh  if 1≤δ  and ( ) 0<
>
′′ hdhh  for any ( )
δ
δ
δ
1
1
1
: 





∆+
−
=
>
<
Thh  if 1>δ . 
    Eq. (17) is able to capture several different features of the ability to work when old of the typical 
agent as a function of the health measure h : it encompasses, in fact, (i) the “saturating” function 
used in the numerical examples by Chakraborty (2004) and Leung and Wang (2010) when 
1=∆=δ  and 00 =d , while also preserving (different from Chakraborty, 2004, and in accord with 
Leung and Wang, 2010) a positive exogenously given level of old age working period regardless of 
whether public health spending exists or not; (ii) the S-shaped function when 1>δ  (i.e., threshold 
effects of public health investments exist) used in the numerical examples by Blackburn and 
Cipriani (2002), Blackburn and Issa (2002), and de la Croix and Ponthiere (2010). 
    The relationship between health status and income (that, in this model, can be considered as a 
proxy of the public health spending, the latter being a constant fraction of income), has been shown 
to be S-shaped by Ecob and Davey Smith (1999)8 which argue that “these indices of morbidity, 
both self-reported and measured, are approximately linearly related to the logarithm of income, in 
all except very high and low incomes (this means that increasing income is associated with better 
health, but that there are diminishing returns at higher levels of income).” (p. 693). Moreover, 
Strauss and Thomas (1998) contrasted an index that captures nutritional status and health (the Body 
Mass Index) with the logarithm of wage income, finding an S-shaped relationship for Brazil (see 
Strauss and Thomas, 1998, Figure 3, p. 774). 
    In order to clarify the interesting dynamical properties of the model, we now resort to some 
numerical exercises taking the following configuration of parameters (exclusively chosen for 
illustrative purposes): 22=A , 45.0=α  (which is an average between the values usually referred to 
                                               
8
 See Ecob and Davey Smith (1999, Figures 1 and 2, p. 698–700), that plot some indices of morbidity as a function of 
the logarithm of income for England, Wales and Scotland in 1984 and 1985. 
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developed countries, i.e. 36.0=α , see e.g., Kehoe and Perri, 2002, and those usually used for 
developing countries, i.e. 50.0=α , see Purdue University’s Global Trade Analysis Project 2005 
database – GTAP), 60.0=β  (see Žamac, 2007), 06.0=τ , 00 =d , 9.01 =d , 50=δ , while also 
assuming 1=∆  without loss of generality, given the purely technical (and not economically 
interpretable) nature of such a parameter. Note that the choice of the parameter 50=δ 9 amounts to 
assume that health investments have a more intense effect in reducing the old age sickness state 
(that is, enhancing the old age health status) when a certain threshold level of public health 
expenditure is achieved, while becoming scarcely effective when the ability to work (the good 
health state) is close to its saturating value.10 
 
                                               
9
 Note that if ( )hd  were concave, i.e. 1≤δ , yd εε >  cannot hold and, hence, non-monotonic trajectories can never 
appear in that case.  
10
 As an example, we may think about the existence of threshold effects in the accumulation of knowledge required for 
new medical advances and discoveries in the treatment of diseases (e.g. vaccines) to be effective: the public health 
expenditure to finance new research projects may be high and apparently useless until a certain degree of knowledge is 
achieved. Beyond such a threshold, however, a “jump” effect exists that allows to trigger and bring to light the 
beneficial effects of the new discoveries, to make them efficient, usable and operative across population and eventually 
transformed into higher health status for old aged individuals. 
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Figure 1. The phase map Eq. (10) with the corresponding steady state when θ  varies. 
 
Table 1 illustrates Figure 1 as regards the effects of a rise in θ  on both the evolution and stability of 
the steady state (to this purpose Table 1 reports the values of the first derivative of Eq. 10 with 
respect to tk  evaluated at the steady state, namely ( )*kJk′ ). Moreover, we also report the values of 
other macroeconomic variables of interest at the steady state, such as the per capita health 
expenditure, *h , the length of the time spent working when old, *d , the level of per capita GDP, 
( ) ( )*** 1 dkAY += α , the ratio of per capita health spending to per capita GDP, ** /Yh , and the ratio 
of the per capita pension expenditure to per capita GDP, ( )
*
**1
Y
pd−
. 
 
Table 1. Macroeconomic variables at the steady state when θ  varies. 
θ  0 0.04 0.07695 0.15 0.25 0.40 0.50 
*k  2.5 2.32 2.23 2.13 2.04 1.92 1.76 
 14 
( )*kJk′  0.32 -0.20 -1.00 -2.65 -4.22 -3.71 -0.69 
*h  1.09 1.061 1.04 1.02 1.001 0.97 0.93 
*d  0.891 0.856 0.80 0.66 0.47 0.19 0.035 
*Y  62.93 59.70 56.85 51.49 44.62 35.3 29.45 
** /Yh  0.017 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.022 0.027 0.031 
( )
*
**1
Y
pd−
 
0 0.02 0.042 0.082 0.137 0.22 0.275 
 
From Table 1 the following results hold. 
 
Result 1. The steady state stock of capital per efficient worker, *k , the per capita health 
expenditure, *h , the length of the working time when old, *d , and the per capita GDP, *Y , 
monotonically reduce when θ  raises. 
 
Result 2. The ratio of the per capita health expenditure to per capita GDP at the steady state, 
** /Yh , and the ratio of the capita pension expenditure to per capita GDP, ( )
*
**1
Y
pd−
 
monotonically increase when θ  raises. 
 
The economic intuition behind Results 1 and 2 is simple. First, we recall that the length of the 
retirement period ( *1 d− ) (conversely, the working period, *d ) depends only on the health status 
when old. Increasing PAYG pensions causes an expected negative effect on capital accumulation 
and wages, and this in turn reduces health expenditure. Although the reduction in health spending is 
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rather small and the ratio between health spending to GDP slightly increases,11 the worsening of the 
health status, that is the reduction in the ability to work, is rather strong: for example, while in the 
absence of public pensions mature workers spent almost 89 per cent of their second period of life 
working, when the size of the pension system is assumed in line with that of several European 
countries (i.e. a payroll tax rate about the 15 per cent of wage income), the working fraction of the 
second period of life drops to about 66 per cent, and when the contribution rate further raises to 
about 25 per cent of wage income, as predicted by many economists for the near future, the time 
spend working in the old-aged shrinks to almost 47 per cent of the whole time endowment. Thus, 
the higher is the size of the PAYG system, the lower per capita GDP. This negative effect on the 
(neoclassical) economic growth is due to a twofold channel: not only the well-known crowding out 
effect of PAYG pensions on savings and capital accumulation properly works, but also a negative 
effect on the labour supply of mature workers exists because of an indirect crowding out effect of 
PAYG pensions on health spending. This mechanism, therefore, resembles rather to a vicious circle: 
the higher the size of the PAYG system, the larger the number of pensioners (i.e. the number of 
mature individuals with bad health, unable to work, raises). 
 
4. Chaotic cycles under perfect foresight and multiple “bubbling” phenomena 
 
In the previous section we analysed the equilibrium dynamical properties of the phase map Eq. (10) 
and illustrated (i) the behaviour of the unique equilibrium, (ii) the switch to instability and the re-
switch to stability with respect to changes in the contribution rate to the pension system. 
    In this section we investigate – with numerical simulations – the local and global dynamics of the 
model using the same parameter θ  as the key bifurcation parameter. 
                                               
11
 Note that the ratio of per capita health spending and pension expenditure to per capita GDP are rather realistic, 
passing from 1.7 per cent to 2.2 per cent and from 0 per cent to 13.7 per cent, respectively, when the payroll tax rate 
raises from zero up to 0.25. 
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    It is shown that the non-linear dynamics described by the time map Eq. (10) may be chaotic, as 
the following example reveals. The parameter set is the same as in the previous section. Moreover, 
we used 10 =k  as the initial value of the stock of capital. 
 
 
Figure 2. Bifurcation diagram for θ  (an enlarged view for 6.00 << θ  and 7.31 * << k ). 
 
Figure 2 clearly reveals a noteworthy dynamical phenomenon: the presence of a twofold “bubbling” 
with a persistent two-period cycle between the two “bubbles” and overall a significant inclusion of 
all trajectories in a bounded region, meaning that the economic system is “resilient”. 
    In order to better understand the appearance of multiple “bubblings”, it is useful to examine the 
picture of the time map Eq. (10), Figure 1, together with the corresponding bifurcation diagram, 
Figure 2, when θ  changes, showing how a period-doubling cascade initiates and then reverses. The 
map has a “bimodal” shape with an increasing concave branch for large capital stocks. The effect of 
increasing the policy variable θ  is both to translate the phase map vertically downwards and flatten 
out the increasing branch of it for large capital stocks. Therefore when θ  is continuously increased 
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from zero, the fixed point12 steadily reduces and the slope of the curve at the intersection point 
shrinks until the value minus one (see the curves A and B when θ  increases from 0 to 0.1 in Figure 
1) when a period-doubling bifurcation occurs (at 07695.0=θ , see Figure 2): the fixed point 
becomes unstable and a stable two-cycle is born, followed, as usual, by a succession of period-
doublings as θ  is gradually raised (see the curve C when 3.0=θ  in Figure 1, and the bifurcation 
diagram Figure 2 in the interval 199.00795.0 << θ ). In contrast, if we consider the case when θ  is 
large, the equilibrium point is stable because it lies in the region of the map where the slope is only 
slightly negative or even positive (see, for example, the curve D in Figure 1 where 5.0=θ  and the 
slope at the intersection point is 69.0− ). As θ  is gradually reduced, the slope of the phase map 
continuously decreases until it reaches the value minus one when a period-doubling bifurcation 
emerges ( 49.0=θ ); again, similar to the case discussed above, the fixed point becomes unstable, a 
stable two-cycle emerges, and for further reductions in θ  a succession of period-doublings results. 
    However, it is easy to observe that at 1995.0=θ  a reversal of period-doublings initially occurs, 
leading to a stable two-period cycle in the interval 39.01995.0 << θ , and this is followed at 
3995.0=θ  by the appearance of new period-doubling cascades. It is interesting to note that, 
although in the interval 39.01995.0 << θ  the slope of the time map at the fixed point is “more 
negative” than outside of that interval (as indicated both by “eye” in Figure 1 and values in the third 
row of Table 1), a simple two-period cycle prevails in such an interval, while outside of it chaotic 
behaviour emerges: this is due to the fact that bifurcations are governed by the “interaction” 
between the two features of the “bimodal” map: the “hump”, which is largely responsible for 
period-doubling, and by the concavity as well as the height above the abscissa-axis of the increasing 
branch for large capital stocks, which are responsible for period-halving. Therefore, it happens that, 
                                               
12
 As is known, the fixed point *k  may be graphically found at the intersection of the 45° line tt kk =+1  and the curve 
described by Eq. (10). The stability of *k  is ensured if the slope of the time map at the intersection point is (in absolute 
value) less than unity. 
 18 
for making a “heuristic” example, when θ  decreases from 0.5 to 0.3 (curve D and curve C in Figure 
1, respectively), on the one hand the slope at the fixed point is always more negative, so that period-
doublings occur more likely, but, on the other hand, both the concavity and the height of the 
increasing branch for large capital stocks tend to be larger, so that period halving also occur. 
Therefore in the overall, the former effect initially prevails and the latter one eventually dominates 
(as Figure 2 shows when θ  decreases from 0.5 to 0.4). 
    Therefore we may sum up this process, saying that as θ  raises from zero (i) the phenomenon of 
period-doubling, once appeared, must necessarily be followed, at least for large values of θ , by 
period-halving, and (ii) the “bubbling” phenomenon may appear even more than once in the present 
model. 
    Noteworthy, in any case the equilibrium dynamics remains bounded in an economically 
meaningful region although it may realistically display irregular business cycles. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We analyzed the standard OLG model with capital accumulation and PAYG pensions when the 
retirement period is dependent on the state of individual health when old, which is, in turn, 
determined by the provision of public health care services. 
    Our focus is on the equilibrium dynamics and our results are the following: (i) equilibrium 
dynamics differ considerably between economies with and without the link between retirement 
period and state of health; (ii) when the link does exist and the relationship between health spending 
and health technology is S-shaped, as is often assumed in literature, we show that the positive 
equilibrium is unique but it may be periodic and unstable prompting endogenous business cycles. 
    Moreover, we found the existence of complicated dynamical phenomena, such as multiple 
“bubblings”, when the contribution to the PAYG system change. However, large PAYG pensions 
are found to work for stability. 
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    The conclusion is that the equilibrium dynamics in this rather simple economy, which is 
completely deterministic, may reconcile the existence of both irregular business cycles as well as 
the self-evident persistence of the economic system. 
    Since the retirement age as well as disability pension and health spending problems currently 
figure prominently on both the pension and public health system reform agendas, then our analysis 
indicates that addressing those issues in a theoretical model might be worthwhile as regards the 
comprehension of dynamical properties of the economy. 
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